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Abstract
The following thesis outlines the Chinese government’s push for new-energy vehicles
within their auto industry. By giving a history of the Chinese automotive industry and the
central planning devices used to push the industry forward, we should develop a more
refined understanding as to the direction of China’s auto industry in the future.
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I. Introduction
China has seen an unprecedented rise over the last thirty years, mainly flourishing
after Deng Xiaoping opened the Chinese economy through radical economic reform.

1

This reform was supplemented by the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) attempt to
overcome the “Century of Humiliation” that China claims to have experienced, using it as
a platform for modern Chinese identity. i The “historical memory” of the country’s
“humiliation” at the hands of foreigners began with China’s defeat in the Opium Wars in
the mid-nineteenth century. The “humiliation” reached an understandable high point with
Japan’s successful industrialization and subsequent invasion and occupation of
Manchuria during World War II. 2 China experienced many different economic and
political reforms since the occupation by Japan in Manchuria; but I believe that it was
Deng Xiaoping’s reforms that started in around 1979 that helped to bring his country
back into the ranks of great powers in the modern world economy.
After nearly three decades as the world’s fastest-growing economy, its’ Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) increasing at a average rate of nearly 10 percent, China became,
early in the twenty-first century, the world’s third largest economy and third largest
trading economy. 3 In 2006 China also became the world’s largest holder of foreign

1

Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power: US Relations with China since 1949, (New York:
Oxford, 1997), 195
2
Orville Schell, “China: Humiliation & the Olympics,” The New York Review of Books, August
14, 2008 issue
3
Warren I. Cohen, America’s Response to China, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010),
5th ed., 263-264
6

exchange reserves, surpassing Japan, with an estimated more than two trillion dollars in
2009, much of it in US Treasury and mortgage company bonds. 4 China’s GDP fell below
10 percent in 2009 after the 2007/08 global economic crisis and has since had 10.4% in
2010, 9.3% in 2011, 7.8% in 2012 and so far in the first half of 2013 it is maintaining,
and projected to keep its’ goal of 7.5% by the end of the year. 5
This rise in economic power has enabled China to spend heavily on the
modernization and expansion of its military forces. 6 According to the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) military expenditure database, China spent
an average of nearly $24 billion US between 1989-98, $65 billion US between 19992008, $142 billion US from 2009-2012, and is currently standing at $166 billion US in
military spending. 7 From these numbers we can see that China’s average expenditure on
military in ten-year spans since 1989 has doubled, with continued projections to keep
rising. While China is still far behind United States current 2012/13 spending of $68
billion US, it is still a most impressive and dramatic increase. 8 The most notable military
expenditure by the Chinese government has been into China’s space program that has
taken flight in recent years, putting up satellites, humans, and the development of the
Chinese own space laboratory to help it further conduct research and development. 9

4

Warren I. Cohen, America’s Response to China, 264
Percent’s of GDP growth rate provided by the World Bank website,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG
6
Warren I. Cohen, America’s Response to China, 264
7
SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,
http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database/milex_database
8
Ibid.
9
China launches Tiangong-1 space lab; Jonathan Amos, “Rocket launches Chinese space lab,”
BBC News, September 29, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-15112760
5

7

It is important, I believe, to address the progress of the Chinese space program
because of how historically influential the space race between the Soviet Union and the
United States in the 1950’s was to eventual uni-polar world system that the United States
leads. The early success of the Soviet Union’s Sputnik satellite caused the United State to
place a new national priority on research science, which led to the development of
microelectronics-the technology used in today’s laptop, personal, and handheld
computers. Many essential technologies of modern life, including the Internet, owe their
early development to the accelerated pace of applied research triggered by Sputnik and
the space race that followed. 10 While China has yet to make any ground breaking
developments in space technology so far, it is important to understand the increase in
space capabilities may lead a country, such as the United States, to question the
confidence in their political and military advantages.
The progress and influence of the Chinese space program is addressed by Kevin
Pollpeter in his monograph, Building for the Future: China’s Progress in Space
Technology During the Tenth 5-year plan and the U.S. Response, in which he argues that
China’s use of space power is part of an integrated approach to increasing its
comprehensive national power and achieving great power status. 11 It was during the 10th
Five-year plan (2001-05) that the Chinese space program made impressive gains, but
compared to other major space powers, China’s space technology still lags behind. 12 The
Five-year plan is a key central planning device that is used by the Chinese government to

10

Paul Dickson, Sputnik: The shock of the Century, (Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 2009)
Kevin Pollpeter, “Building for the Future: China’s Progress in Space Technology During the
Tenth 5-year plan and the U.S. Response,” March 2008, ISBN 1-58487-347-7
12
Kevin Pollpeter, “Building for the Future,” vii
11
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establish goals and targets for key Chinese industries and the development of weaker
industries lacking in prowess. An official grand strategy has emerged from the Chinese
leadership in their publishing of the White Papers beginning in 1998, and each
subsequent year after, in which the Chinese leadership appears to have reached a
consensus on a plan which sustains the conditions necessary for economic growth and
military modernization in the context of operating in a uni-polar world dominated by the
United States. This strategy is designed to ultimately usher in a multi-polar world in
which China is one of several great powers by protecting China’s core national interests
against external threats and by shaping the international system in which it operates. 13
In pushing for a multi-polar world, Chinese diplomatists devised a variety of
“partnerships” with major powers. With Russia they crafted a “strategic cooperative
partnership” that they insisted was not an alliance or directed at any third country, it was
still perceived as such nonetheless. Neither Moscow nor Beijing was ready to antagonize
Washington. Chinese leaders sought to develop similar ties to Great Britain, France, and
Germany, anticipating a strategic relationship with the European Union. They even
worked toward partnerships with Japan and India, two nations with which their relations
were prickly. But their highest priority was always achieving a stable relationship with
the United States. They needed the American market and American technology. 14

13
14

Ibid. pg vii
Warren I. Cohen, America’s Response to China, 265
9

The American economy is a free capitalist economy, open and subject to many
market forces, with no individual player able to change the direction. 15 The idea of state
involvement in business as a bad thing has been supported both theoretically and
empirically but is still and will continue to be a subject of debate. ii This can be contrasted
to the Chinese economy that relies on central planning and heavy state involvement to
develop markets with in its’ economy. A recent example of this form of state
involvement that addresses the structure of the economy as well as the role the
government should play in a citizen’s life was the release of Document No: 9 in August
2013. 16 This document and the “guidelines” provided look to end the “western anti-China
forces” that have attempted to advocate “new liberalism” with the aim of dismantling
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and changing China’s basic economic system and the
challenging of the Party’s control. 17 But what is the Chinese economic system?
Ian Bremmer, president of the Eurasia group, describes the Chinese system as a
state capitalist economy that has seen undisputed progress economically with state
intervention and central planning. There are two fundamental differences between freemarket and state capitalism. First policy makers do not embrace state capitalism as a
temporary series of steps meant to rebuild a shattered economy or to jump-start an
economy out of recession. It’s a strategic long-term policy choice. Second, state
capitalists see markets primarily as a tool that serves national interests rather than as an
15

The US government did step-in in 2009 and bail out companies to keep the market afloat,
however if it were to enforce such control during a prosperous market there would be sever
backlash from companies and citizens.
16
Jayadeva Ranade, “China: Document No. 9 and the New Propaganda Regime,” Institute of
Peace and Conflict Studies, (4175), (November 2013), http://www.ipcs.org/article/china/ipcsspecial-commentary-china-document-no-9-and-the-new-4175.html
17
Jayadeva Ranade, China: Document No. 9
10

engine of opportunity for the individual. State capitalist use markets to extend their own
political and economic leverage – both within society and on the international stage. 18 As
noted by Kevin Pollpeter, the Chinese space program is an example of a strategic policy
choice used to gain political and economic leverage through the central planning device
of the Five-year plan.
I argue that an often overlooked example of such strategic planning process
induced by the political objective of the Chinese government to further modernize and
empower the national economy and its international standing, is the auto industry. The
Chinese auto industry, its’ development, and planned future fit this category perfectly.
The significance of this industry should not be overlooked and there has been little
documentation of its importance to help China create a new multi-polar world system. In
this paper I will provide a brief history of the Chinese auto industry, followed by an
examination of the central planning used to develop the industry, then discuss the short
comings of the plans and what may have contributed to those failures, and close with an
examination of the future of the industry. I hope that my presentation of the material will
help articulate a story in which China is planning to use its’ auto industry to shift the
center of the global economy from an unipolar system dominated by the United States to
a new Chinese world order of multi-polarity.

18

Ian Bremmer, “The end of the free market: who wins the war between states and
corporations?,” European View, (9), (2010), 249-252
11

II. History of Central Planning and the Emergence of the Chinese Auto
Industry
To first understand the history of the auto industry in China we must first identify
what the central planning system of the Chinese government is and how it was shaped
and developed over time. This will give us a framework as to how the development of the
Chinese auto industry is in line with the central planning of the government, and even
though China is considered to be a market based economy by many, it is still the central
planning that drives its’ industries forward.
The Great Leap Forward was one of the biggest mass mobilizations of a country’s
people by a central government. Initiated by Mao Zedong around the1950’s, it was a
duplicate of the Stalinist model – rapid, forced industrialization, under state direction and
control. 19 This soviet model included a steep rate of capital formation, overwhelming
emphasis on industrial development, high priority of heavy industry in investment
allocation, and preference for large plants and capital-intensive techniques. 20iii The
Chinese government carried out a system of planned economy, and targets and quotas for
various spheres of economic development were all set by the special “planning
committees” of the state. Factories produced goods according to state plans, and farmers
planted crops also according to state plans. Commercial departments replenished and sold
their stocks according to state plans, and the qualities, quantities and prices of the goods
were all fixed by planning departments. Mao Zedong wanted to achieve even more rapid
industrial growth once the soviet institutional model was in place by using this system of
19

Morris L. Bian, The Making of the State Enterprise System in Modern China, (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005), 2
20
Ibid. pg 2
12

planned economy; however, there were dire consequences to the mass mobilization and
reforms needed to be made. 2122
The Chinese recognized that, on one hand, this system contributed to the stable,
planned development of China’s economy, but on the other it also limited the
development of the economy and sapped its vitality. The government’s policies kept the
Chinese economy stagnant and inefficient, mainly because most aspects of the economy
were managed and run by the central regime (and thus there were few profits incentives
for firms, workers, and farmers), competition was virtually nonexistent, foreign trade and
investment flows were mainly limited to soviet bloc countries, and price and production
control caused widespread distortions in the economy. By 1978 nearly three-fourths of
industrial production was produced by centrally controlled, State-owned Enterprises
(SOEs), according to centrally planned output targets as briefly mentioned before. 23 In
1978 after Mao’s death, the Chinese government initiated gradual economic reforms
according to free market principles to break with its’ soviet style economic policies and
open up trade and investment with the West, with the hope that is would significantly
increase economic growth and raise living standards. 24

21

Morris L. Bian, The Making of the State Enterprise System, 3
The mass mobilization of Chinese citizens into a commune system to push and develop
industrial growth led to the Great Leap Famine; a crisis that resulted in 30 million excess deaths
and about 33 million lost or postponed births, making it one of the worst catastrophes in human
history. An examination of existing economic studies of the Great Leap crisis is provided by
Justin Yifu Lin and Dennis Tao Yang: “On the Causes of China’s Agricultural Crisis and the
Great Leap Famine,” China Economic Review, Volume 9, (2), (1998), 125-140
23
Wayne M. Morrison, “China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications
for the United States,” Congressional Research Service, September 5, 2013, 2
24
Wayne M. Morrison, “China’s Economic Rise,” 3
22
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Some of the first reforms that were initiated were direct ownership and price
incentives for farmers that enabled them to sell a portion of their crops on the free market
and keep the rest for themselves. 25 The continual push for trade liberalization in other
sectors was a major key to China’s economic success; removing trade barriers
encouraged greater competition and attracted Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). 26iv The
exceptional growth of the Chinese economy since the reforms started demonstrate how
effective they were and how the gradual implementation allowed their government to
identify which policies produced favorable outcomes and which did not so that the
correct industries received investment. v So when did the auto industry emerge as a
favorable economic industry to the Chinese government?
The Chinese automotive industry was established after Japan’s occupation of
Manchuria that began in 1931. While the occupation of the Japanese Imperial Army was,
in many ways, devastating to Chinese society, a future focal point for the “Century of
Humiliation”, the Japanese, after their defeat and subsequent withdrawal, left behind an
industrial base in Manchuria, allowing China to gain some of the some of the hardware
necessary to support a commercial vehicle industry. 27 Manchuria owes its early
development to a combination of good natural resources and easy access to the world
outside China; the availability of iron ore facilitated the development of an iron and steel

25

This led to the breakdown of the agricultural commune system whose failure had eventually
caused the Great Leap Famine.
26
Wayne M. Morrison, “China’s Economic Rise,” 3
27
G. E. Anderson, Designated Drivers: How China Plans to Dominate the Global Auto Industry,
(John Wiley & Sons: Singapore, 2012), 53
14

industry, mainly under Japanese control. 28 In lacking sufficient expertise in the industry
China reached out to the Soviet Union in 1950 that transferred designs for commercial
trucks and a Jeep-like all-terrain vehicle. 29 The Chinese government established First
Auto Works (a state-owned enterprise) in Changchun, the capital of Jilin province in
northeast Chinese that produced trucks from the soviet designs. By 1958 First Auto
Works also began to produce the Hongqi limousine for state leaders, and in another
factory in Shanghai it began to produce a Phoenix model sedan. However, production of
passenger cars never reached significant scale; China never produced more than 100
passenger cars in a single year. 30 In terms of its role in Chinese industry, Manchuria had
become the counterpart of Pittsburgh, Detroit, and the industrial Midwest of the United
States put together. 31 In the late 1960’s, it established the Second Auto Works in the
mountains near Wuhan in central China. 32 The handful of passenger cars that were
manufactured in Changchun or Shanghai went either to China’s leaders or to taxi fleets in
the larger cities.
It should be noted that this initial development of the auto industry was under the
supervision of Mao Zedong whose strict ties to communism had little interest in
consumerism and a vast need for passenger cars for the everyday citizen. This mind set
28

Nai-Ruenn Chen and Walter Galenson, The Chinese Economy Under Communism, (Chicago:
Aldine Publishing Company, 1969), 85
29
G. E. Anderson, Designated Drivers, 53
30
Eric Harwit, “China’s Automobile Industry: Policies, Problems, and Prospects,” Studies on
contemporary China, (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 17-18.; Nai-Ruenn Chen and Walter
Galenson, The Chinese Economy Under Communism, 85
31
Nai-Ruenn Chen and Walter Galenson, The Chinese Economy Under Communism, 8; Detroit
was the home of the United States automotive industry as it emerged. See: Steven Klepper, “The
Evolution of the U.S. Automobile Industry and Detroit as its Capital,” (Carnegie Mellon
University, Pittsburgh: November 2001)
32
Wan-Wen Chu, “How the Chinese government promoted a global automobile industry,”
Industrial and Corporate Change, (Oxford University Press), (2011), 5
15

shifted as Deng Xiaoping was able to consolidate power and gain support for major
economic reforms in 1978. 33
The communist influences from the Mao era carried over into the new
development of the Chinese auto industry because not all of China’s senior leaders
agreed on the importance of an automobile industry, particularly one that produced
passenger cars. Personal ownership of vehicles would remain technically illegal until
1984, and even if ownership had not been illegal, few Chinese could afford to buy a
car. 34 1978 was perhaps the first year following the Cultural Revolution in which China
enjoyed enough political stability that officials could begin to think seriously about the
industry. Deng Xiaoping stressed that China should learn from the west and from his
overall leadership, the automobile industry shifted gears from imports to partnerships
with the foreign automakers to stop the flooding of Japanese imports that occurred during
the late 1970’s and early 1980’s as China removed its’ trade barriers. 35
China approached and formed joint ventures during the 1980’s with American
Motor Corps of the United States to set up the Beijing Jeep Company, Volkswagen of
Germany formed the Shanghai Auto Industry Corporation-VW, and PSA PeugeotCitroen of France followed with Guangzhou-Peugeot. Meanwhile, First Auto Works
(FAW) and Second Auto Works (SAW) also shifted to joint venture. In 1992, FAW-VW

33

On Deng Xiaoping’s consolidation, see Richard Baum, Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the
Age of Deng Xiaoping (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 27-47.
34
G. E. Anderson, Designated Drivers, 57.
35
G. E. Anderson, Designated Drivers, 56
16

was established, and SAW and Citroen also set up the joint venture Shenlong. 36 The chart
below depicts how explosive the rise in passenger car production was in China after
1978.
Refer to Figure 1 in Appendix
The rise in production, as provided by Figure 1, sparked the reinstatement of the
China National Automotive Industry Corporation (CNAIC) which had seen a short lived
authority over some 75 industrial plants including China’s main auto factories in
Changchun, Beijing, Nanjing, Chongqing, and Wuhan from 1964 to 1965 after which it
was disrupted by the Cultural Revolution. It was the governmental body that had
approved the establishment of Second Auto Works (that would later change its name to
Dongfeng). 37 Before the reemergence of CNAIC the Machinery Industry Ministry (MIM)
was the leading government body in charge of the auto industry. 38 This new version of
CNAIC that emerged in 1982 was, on paper, a powerful organization; it oversaw the
major auto enterprises, FAW and SAW, as well as factories in Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai,
Chongqing, and elsewhere. 39
CNAIC did play a key role in increasing the importance of the auto industry to the
highest level of leadership in China’s State Council and economic planning apparatus by
acting as a think tank for the industry and giving policy recommendations. 40 In its very

36

“A Fifty Year Chronology of China’s Automotive Industry,” China Automotive Technology
and Research Center, (2003), http://www.chinaauto.ac.cn/zhishi/ZG50DSJ.htm
37
G. E. Anderson, Designated Drivers, 54.
38
Wan-Wen Chu, “How the Chinese government promoted a global automobile industry,” 5
39
Eric Harwit, “China’s Automobile Industry: Policies, Problems, and Prospects,” 52
40
Previously to CNAIC, the automobile industry was not even included in the sixth five-year
plan. Wan-Wen Chu, “How the Chinese government promoted a global automobile industry,” 6
17

first policy recommendation document, CNAIC received the following instruction from
the Chinese leaders, “as long as there is a market, produce without limits;” which
essentially gave permission to produce vehicles according to market demand. 41 The
China National Automobile Industry Corporation was later changed into the China
National Automobile Industry Association, if effect, changing it from ‘a high-level,
independent organization into one managed by its members, serving as a bridge between
enterprises and the government.’ 42 A further administrative reform in 1998 disbanded 15
industry-aligned ministries, and the MIM was restructured into a Machinery Industry
Bureau under the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC). Then in 2003, this part
of the SETC merged with the State Development Planning Commission, originally the
State Planning Commission, to form the National Development and Reform Commission
(NDRC) in 2003. Now the industrial policy bureau under NDRC has an auto section that
governs auto related policies. The newly established State-Owned Assets Supervision and
Administration Commission (SASAC) manage major SOEs, including the FAW and
SAW, from 2003. The state-owned China Automotive Technology and Research Center,
which does R&D works, was established in 1985 and came under SASAC in 2003. The
semi-official China Association of Automobile Manufacturers handles many of the policy
and coordination tasks. 43 The shift within these organizations shows a struggle to find a
way to better conduct the industrial policy. What then can direct the traffic over this
bridge between the different enterprises and the central government? The traditional fiveyear planning system/process is such a device. The automobile industry was part of the

41

G. E. Anderson, Designated Drivers, 58
Ibid. Pg 59
43
Wan-Wen Chu, “How the Chinese government promoted a global automobile industry,” 11
42
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seventh five-year plan (1986-1990) which announced that the ‘automotive industry was
an important pillar industry, demanded it follow the principles of high starting point,
mass production, and specialization to establish backbone enterprises as leaders.’ 44
In the next chapter I will analyze some of the key five-year plans in which the
automotive industry is represented and discussed, however, I will mostly focus on the
1994 and 2004 auto industry specific plans along with The Auto Industry Adjustments
made from 2009-2011 that was implemented after the 2007/2008 world economic crisis
so we can better understand the current trends the Chinese automotive industry is taking
and if they have been successful with past goals and objectives.

44

Wan-Wen Chu, “How the Chinese government promoted a global automobile industry,” 12
19

III. Five-year Planning and the Development of the Auto Industry
The basic central planning device of the Chinese government is the Five-year
planning system. This planning apparatus is inherited from the Soviet model that
emerged under Stalin, who enacted the Soviet Union’s first Five-year plan in 1928. This
initial model received much debate with in the Russian Communist Party as to the
appropriate policy lines; one wanting joint development of agriculture and industry, and
the other who urged that industry be accorded high priority with agriculture to fulfill the
function of providing the means of capital accumulation without itself receiving any
substantial initial investment. Stalin chose the latter course and instituted collectivization
of farming to facilitate the collection of agricultural commodities from a recalcitrant
peasantry. 45 The Chinese Communist Party, shortly after assuming power in 1949,
developed and enacted their first Five-year plan in 1953 to overcome an economy that
was badly battered by war and inflation. 46 In choosing their initial development strategy,
the Chinese Communist Party had to take into account a pattern of land, labor, and capital
resources that differed greatly from that confronting the Soviet Union at the time of their
first Five-year plan.
The Chinese were clearly at a considerable disadvantage compared with the
Soviet Union who had a better endowment of arable land, and its grain output per capita
was twice that of China. The Russian transportation network was better developed. While
the Soviet Union of 1928 was by no means an advanced nation economically, it was
considerably ahead of the China of 1952. In its educational and technical training levels,
45
46

Nai-Ruenn Chen and Walter Galenson, The Chinese Economy Under Communism, 34
Ibid. pg 33-34
20

particularly important for development, the Soviet Union was substantially more
advanced. 47 The Chinese peasants were living close to the margin of subsistence, and
little food was left over to feed the thousands of workers required by new industrial
enterprises; Stalin was able to extract a continuous stream of saving from the farm sector
to finance his industrialization program, while the Chinese eventually ran up against the
limiting factor of inadequate food supplies. 48 The Chinese, however, were determined to
outdo the Russians in speed of industrialization.
Almost half of the Chinese first Five-year plan went to industry, considerably
more than the first Soviet Five-year plan allocated for this sector. 49 The Chinese were
still at the mercy of the Soviets, even in 1953. Lacking in engineers and designers, as
well as skilled labor, it would have been difficult for the Chinese to reject the advice of
the Soviet technicians sent to help them construct and operate new plants as about half of
all investment in heavy industry consisted of 156 Russian-designed projects. 50 The
Chinese new found industry was only, again, a replica of the Soviet model that had come
before. Among these designs would have been the commercial trucks, Liberation C10,
and the Jeep-like all-terrain vehicles that kick started the automotive industry in China. 51
In the previous chapter and the beginning of this chapter it was discussed that the
Great Leap Forward, initiated by the First Five-year plan, led to the eventual Great Leap
Famine which in turn led to the introduction of more cautious policy planning by the
47

Nai-Ruenn Chen and Walter Galenson, The Chinese Economy Under Communism, 35
Ibid. pg 36
49
Ibid. pg 39
50
Ibid. pg 39
51
Fu Baozong, “Comparison of Automotive Industry Policy between China & Korea,” (a
presentation given at the Academy of Macroeconomic Research, National Development &
Reform Commission, P.R China), slide 6
48
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Chinese Communist Party. vi The Chinese seemed to embrace the strategy of balanced
growth, except that the planners, rather than the market, are to guide the economy into
activities that maximize current output. 52 As mentioned in Chapter one, it was not until
the 7th Five-year plan that the auto industry was specified as an important pillar to
continue China’s industrial and economic success. The top concerns for the industry in
the 7th Five-year plan were industry fragmentation, technology acquisition, and foreign
exchange. 53 At this early date, industry leaders had already become concerned that there
were too many factories, stating the goal for the industry was to follow the lead of
backbone enterprises and gradually form a number of enterprise groups. 54 The Chinese
economic planners already had in mind a system in which the industry would operate,
influenced by their initial industrial experience with the Soviet Union.
As the Soviets had provided technology, designs, and advice to the Chinese in the
initial foreign exchange to get their industry up in running, the Chinese had high hopes
that early joint ventures they engaged in with American Motor Corps, Volkswagen, and
PSA Peugeot-Citroen would be as beneficial to establishing the foundation for a complete
auto industry in China. Much to the disappointment of the Chinese, this was not the case.
The joint ventures were counted upon to build cars and parts that could be exported (in
addition to those built for the domestic market). Those exports would then generate
foreign exchange needed to pay for imports of foreign made parts. Those imports would
bring Chinese automakers the technology they needed to advance their industry. With

52

Nai-Ruenn Chen and Walter Galenson, The Chinese Economy Under Communism, 48
G. E. Anderson, Designated Drivers, 60
54
This was a continuation of the points established by the Communist Party in 1961, where they
also called for consolidation of industries. Ibid. pg 60.
53
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that technology in hand, the plan urges enterprises to absorb equipment, technology and
processes from overseas … [and] carry out improvements and innovation on imported car
models. 55 Without first mastering the technology, it would be impossible for China to sell
exports, so the system of foreign exchange, as hoped by the Chinese, never fully
materialized. China’s planners envisioned a fairly quick localization of parts production
for cars assembled by joint ventures, but the foreign partners resisted using locally made
parts until the parts could be made according to their standards of and safety and
quality. 5657 This wishful thinking by the Chinese could have been in part because of their
previous experience with the Soviet Union who willfully engaged in foreign exchange
with China’s industries. While this hopefulness is not particularly blatant in Chinese
legislation, the connection does seem relevant since the Chinese were again looking to
foreign technology to boost their economy.
The 7th Five-year plan envisioned that the auto industry would produce 600,000
vehicles by 1990. This target was reached two years early, in 1988, when China produced
a total of 648,951 vehicles. However, production dropped below the 600,000 mark in
1989 and 1990 during the upheaval following the unrest in Beijing in the spring of 1989
(after which Chinese companies had difficulty getting raw materials from over seas) and
subsequent backlash by conservative hard liners among the Chinese Communist Party

55

G. E. Anderson, Designated Drivers, 60
Ibid. pg 61
57
SAE International is an organization that helps to regulate the safety and quality of automobiles
across the world. These were such standards that China had trouble reaching in their early joint
ventures. http://www.sae.org/
56
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leadership effected the country’s economic plans. 58 The 8th Five-year plan (1991-1995)
contained mostly variations on a common theme. Whereas the previous plan had called
for innovation through improvement of foreign technology, this plan simply wanted it
done faster. And in a clear indication that China had yet to shake off the yoke of central
planning, the industry’s quantitative target was once again based on supply instead of
demand. The industry set a production target of 900,000 vehicles by 1995 (from 509,000
in 1990), a target that it very easily surpassed with 1,452,237 vehicles produced in
1995. 59 However, the Chinese Communist Party was not satisfied with the direction of
the auto industry and developed specific policies to move the industry in the direction
they wanted during the 8th Five-year plan.
The State Planning Commission, State Economy, Trade Commission, and the
Ministry of Machinery Industry submitted the 1994 Automotive Industrial Policy in
February 1994; the State Council approved it in March of that year and published it in
July 1994. The policy had four key objectives: (1) to establish large-scale groups of
saloon and light truck producers (to replace the small-scale, scattered manufacturers,
again trying to consolidate the industry); (2) to improve the components industry; (3) to
create automotive product development capabilities and (4) to encourage individual car
ownership. 60 A report submitted by the Development Research Center of the State
Council, World Trade Organization, and China’s Auto Industry, summarized Chinese
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autos’ weak competitive position as ‘outdated products, high prices, and lack of
independent research and development ability,’ and attributed this to too much protection
by the import substitution policy (used in the previous Five-year plans), and insufficient
private demand. At this stage, none of the existing Chinese automakers or local
government had the ability to lead the changes. It was still up to the central government
to drive the next round of industrial upgrading; entering the World Trade Organization
and improving competitiveness. 61
This push to enter the World Trade Organization (WTO) is captured in the 10th
Five-year plan of China that includes specific directions for the auto industry. vii The 10th
Five-year plan echoed those sentiments from the World Trade Organization and China’s
Auto Industry report that China’s auto industry was not competitive with the foreign
producers, and that a structural adjustment would be necessary. 62 So what niche of the
auto industry did the Chinese believe they could become competitive in and how would
they adjust the industry to make this happen?
China joined the WTO in 2002, one year after the start of the 10th Five-year plan,
and from this followed a number of steps to open up the market, including tariff
reductions and eliminating local content requirements. 63 These actions rapidly advanced
the growth of China’s automotive market. The government looks to the automotive
industry to drive economic growth throughout the entire economy including a variety of
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basic and service-related sectors such as machinery, rubber, petrochemicals, electronics,
textiles, auto financing, aftermarket distribution channels and automotive repair
services. 64 As an aspiring economic power, China had noted that all other major
economic powers had auto industries and decided that that this was an important status
indicator. 65 After China’s entrance into the WTO, the automotive industry began to grow
faster than ever.
Refer to Figure 2 in the Appendix
Due to such rapid success of the Chinese auto industry after joining the WTO
(depicted in the sharp jump after 2002), the 1994 Automobile Industrial Policy was
revised in 2004.
The old 1994 ‘Automobile Industrial Policy took on new light in 2004 entitled,
‘Automotive Industry Development Policy. 66 It differed from the industrial policy of
1994 as it offered encouragement and strategic direction, rather than regulation. First, the
lifting of high tariffs loosened government control over the industry, allowing market
forces to influence its’ future. Second the government encouraged and supported private
auto consumption, which helped to expand the passenger car market. Third, the increase
in foreign investment and the entrance of more private capital into the industry has meant
that overall production capacity (and economies of scale) have been growing fast. With
falls in vehicle prices, private ownership has grown and private buyers are new the
majority market; the parts industry has grown along with automobile-related services
64
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such as auto finance, repair, maintenance and insurance. 67 The effects of this change in
policy (along with the new WTO membership) can again be seen in the dramatic increase
in Figure 2.
Following this growth the Chinese put forth the 11th Five-year plan (2006-2010)
with the observation that China’s approach to auto manufacturing would need to become
more strategic; changing their policy approach once again from a gradual evolution from
a list of wants and production targets, to more detailed plans covering aspects of the
industry that had not even rated a mention in years past. 68 The opening paragraphs of the
auto industry’s portion of the 11th Five-year plan contain words that had not previously
appeared in industrial plans: independent development, sustainable development, and
structural optimization. Translated, this meant that Chinese auto makers would continue
to be urged to develop their own brands and vehicles, and that those vehicles needed to
be more efficient, more environmentally friendly, and made from more recycled and
recyclable materials. The overall message of the 11th Five-year plan was that auto firms
would no longer be judged simply by the size or number of vehicles produced annually
but also by whether they truly contributed to the eventual dominance by Chinese
automakers of their domestic market and to the industry’s independence from reliance on
foreign technology and intellectual property. 69 The push to dominate and assume control
of their domestic auto industry by the Chinese in the 11th Five-year plan, I believe, is an
attempt to protect themselves from influences abroad and a continued push for their
multi-polar world by focusing on energy security through the auto industry.
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The next chapter will continue the evaluation of centrally planned policies,
however, it will highlight that because of the dramatic increase in auto production and the
domestic market, sparked by the WTO membership, China’s energy security has been
compromised due to an increasing gap between the production and consumption of oil.
The Chinese have implemented and adjusted certain policies, beginning with the 11th
Five-year plan, to use their auto industry as a platform to overcome vulnerability and,
hopefully, shift the balance of the global auto industry in their favor.
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IV. Energy Security and Emergence of New-energy Vehicles
In 1993, China became a net oil importer, and by 2010 more than 54% of the
crude oil supply relied on imports. 70 This gap between production and consumption took
a large increase after WTO ascension in 2002, as provided by the graph below.
Refer to Figure 3 in Appendix
The large increase in consumption was a result of the auto industry increasing at
the same time; cars use gasoline: more cars = a higher need for gasoline. So to overcome
this direct correlation, and potential future hazard to energy security, the Chinese
government exemplified the need for new-energy vehicles viii in the 11th Five-year plan.
The first mentioning of electric or hybrid vehicles in policies affecting the auto
industry actually occurred during the 10th Five-year plan; however, the most advanced
auto markets had barely began to experiment with alternative ways to power personal
transportation. 71 General Motors had developed the EV1 electric car during the 1990’s,
than unceremoniously killed the project in 1990. 72 The only production hybrid vehicles
on the road at this time were Toyota’s Prius and the Honda Insight, both still only items
of curiosity outside of Japan at the time. In short, Japan’s auto makers were only
beginning to test the market for alternative vehicles, Detroit appeared to have lost
interest, and the leaders of China’s Communist Party thought it an important enough
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trend to mention it in their economic plan. 73 The 10th Five-year plan only looked to
support research institutions to develop the technological research and development of
NEV’s; it was not until the 11th Five-year plan that the production of NEV’s became an
important policy mandate. 74
In 2006, the State Council adopted the China Science and Technology Medium
and Long-term Development Plan, which moved NEVs from the laboratories or
prototypes to the market and road in a large volume. It was the first time the NEV term
was mentioned in the official policies and specified focusing on hybrid, alternative fuel,
and fuel cell vehicles and later officially defined in the Management Rule on New Energy
Vehicle Production. The Ministry of Science and Technology continued its support on
the NEVs and initiated the Energy Savings and New Energy Vehicle Key Project under
the 863 Program. 75 The year 2008, however, brought a new set of challenges for China’s
auto industry and in response, the “Automotive Readjustment and Revitalization Plan”
was released in March of 2009 by the State Council. 76
The “Automotive Readjustment and Revitalization Plan” was among 10-issued
industry adjustment and renovation plans that aimed to boost different Chinese industries
amid a global economic slowdown. The plan intended to make the Chinese auto motive
industry more competitive; the plan called for the overall improvement in automotive
technologies, including greater fuel efficiency, development of new energy sources, and
73
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new safety features. These measures appear to be inline with the government’s ongoing
efforts to curb growing energy dependence on imported oil; gasoline consumption by
motor vehicles accounts for about one-third of China’s total oil demand. 77ix This plan can
be seen as a step by the Chinese government to address the energy security issue and by
focusing economic growth on NEV’s, they can side step the effects of their growing oil
dependence; or at least try to diminish their effects and vulnerability that showed during
the economic crisis of 2007/2008. To do so the Energy Savings and New Energy Vehicle
Pilot Program was required and initiated by the plan, setting the goal that, by 2011, NEV
sales should account for 5% of the total sales of passenger vehicles. As a result of the
auto industry stimulus plan, China exceeded the United States as the world’s largest new
vehicle market in 2009, an the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Science and
Technology launched the NEV demonstration and promotion program by issuing the
Notice on Implementing Energy Savings and New Energy Vehicle Pilot Program. 78 This
pilot program was also widely called the Thousands of Vehicles, Tens of Cities Program
(TVTC Program).
The TVTC Program focuses on the demonstration of HEV’s, BEV’s, and FCV’s
in public service vehicle fleets, including buses, taxis, government vehicles, and special
purpose vehicles. Beginning in January 2009, 13 Tier I cities were approved to carry out
demonstration, following that seven additional, Tier II cities, were added in May 2010
and five more cities (Tier III) in August 2010 for a total of 25 cities. 79 Both the national
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government and local governments provide financial support to NEV demonstration in
the 25 cities. National subsidies mainly cover the extra cost to buy NEV’s, while
financial support of local governments partially covers the extra cost of the vehicle and
focuses on infrastructure development (like charging stations) and vehicle maintenance.
The amount of subsidies that each vehicle could receive depends on the vehicle’s
category, technology type, and vehicle efficiency performance. 80 These types of subsidies
help to create many benefits to the buyer who normally would not consider an NEV.
The cities involved in this program created their own goals for NEVs, and by the
end of 2012 these 25 cities could add up to 52,623 vehicles to the public sector. Some of
these cities, Shenzhen, Beijing, and Shanghai have the most ambitious goals while some
other cities have even tried to set goals higher than the government provided ones. 81 343
models from 70 makers were approved to receive subsidies after launching the TVTC
program. Among the 70 makers, the median number of models per maker is only three,
although the top maker has 26 NEV models; moreover, 20 makers have only 1 model
each. From the technology aspect, hybrid vehicles definitely were the mainstream
technology before 2009. After that, impacted by the national policy direction shift to
battery electric vehicles, BEV models became popular. Several FCV models were
certified for demonstration, but the number is quite small. Overall, HEVs, BEVs, and
80
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FCVs account for 41%, 55% and 4% of the total NEV models respectively. Buses, cars,
and specialty vehicles account for 63%, 21%, and 16% respectively. 82
In comparing NEV bus and car makers with conventional bus and car makers,
data shows that most top 10 conventional bus and car makers have joined the NEV
production, but only some of them play an active role in developing NEVs. Interestingly,
new players or conventional makers that are not in a leading market position tend to be
more active in NEV market. For example, in 2011, none of the top 3 NEV buses come
from the conventional bus makers. Cherry and BYD (Chinese auto companies) rank first
and third as NEV carmakers, but they only rank seventh and ninth among top 10
conventional carmakers. This trend implies that the non-dominating, conventional vehicle
makers consider that NEVs offer a better opportunity to successfully compete against the
dominating makers. 83
NEV’s offer, not only, the Chinese automakers an opportunity to leapfrog and
successfully compete against the dominating automakers around the world, but it is also
developing a wall against energy security threats. As the Chinese auto market continues
to grow so will China’s dependence on oil, unless, as the Chinese Communist Party
hopes as seen by the establishment of the TVTC program, the push to develop NEVs on a
national scale will help cut that dependence. The subsidies provided by the TVTC
program allow cities and citizens to purchase NEVs for a price normally not possible,
opening the door to an increase in the market as a whole. The Chinese government is now
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half way through its 12th Five-year plan that has again used the auto industry as an
important pillar for development, however, this time its focus is purely on the
development of NEVs as the government does not believe that the whole auto industry be
included. 84 The next chapter will examine the 12th Five-year plan and how it highlights
the shift in policy by the Chinese government to promote alternative energy, NEVs, and
its energy security.

84

Liang Dongmei, “China to Forgo Five-Year Plan for Auto Industry,” Caixin newspaper, April
7, 2011
34

V. The 12th Five-year Plan And The Focus on New Energy
The 12th Five-year plan x that was adopted in March 2011 turns out to be a key
period for China to transform its economic development model in order to find an
appropriate way of lower carbon development, which will largely rely upon a clean and
efficient development engine. 85 By 2015, the Chinese economy is expected to grow by
50% to $7.5 trillion US. It is also expected that the working population in China will peak
in 2015 to 2017. With a large working population expected in its’ near future, and
expected continual growth of its economy, China, through emphasis in the 12th Five-year
plan, is shifting from a focus on the quantity of growth to the quality of development. 86
China realizes there is a need to restructure its economy to address the energy security
threats from oil consumption mentioned earlier. China is trying to steer its economy
toward higher value-added sectors so that its competitiveness will lie not only on its low
labor cost but also in putting more focus on innovation, technology, and higher
productivity; while at the same time, it’s ability to develop its low-carbon policy and
strategy in meeting the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The
12th Five-year plan includes many new industrial policies to support clean energy
industries and related technologies. 87
These industries include nuclear, solar, wind, and biomass energy technology
industries, as well as hybrid and electric vehicles (NEVs), and energy saving and
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environmental protection technology industries. 88 The 12th Five-year plan highlights its
goal of energy intensity reduction of 16% through some of its planned targets for the
NEV industry. China will support the development of key components of energy-efficient
and new energy automobiles. With regard to manufacturers of electric motors and
batteries, China hopes that three to five ‘backbone’ enterprises will emerge with their
combined market share exceeding 60%. China will produce 5 million NEVs and become
the number one producer of new energy vehicles in the world by 2020. The average fuel
economy of passenger vehicles will be 4.5/100 kilometers by 2020, the same as European
standards. 89 China wants to show that it can follow the same standards as the other global
players, such as Europe, and by targeting a 30% reduction for fuel consumption and
carbon emissions of new vehicles, they can begin to talk the same issues as other
countries. The 12th Five-year plan continues China’s plans to reduce its dependence on
fossil fuels by laying out policies for its alternative energy sector.
The Chinese want, by the end of 2015, to generate a total power generation
capacity from non-fossil fuels of 474 GW, which is 33% of the total power generation
capacity; while the non-fossil-fuel energy sources will replace over 500 million tons of
coal 90, this will exceed the total non-fossil fuel generated by the EU of about 450 GW in
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2015. 91 While China continues to try and overcome the European countries with its new
policy goals, what alternative energy industries does it see fueling this change? As
mentioned earlier, nuclear, solar, wind, and hydroelectric power are the main industries
under the Chinese focus, but I believe this change in alternative energy and true reduction
in carbon emissions will be derived from the development of the NEV policies of the 12th
Five-year plan.
There have been some very ambitious targets formulated by the Chinese
government as well as individual provinces and municipalities: overall, China has set out
a goal of introducing 1 million new-energy cars by 2015 (cumulatively) and that number
to reach 5 million by 2020. It furthermore aims to drive down battery costs and achieve a
production capacity of 1 million new-energy vehicles by 2015, with pure-electric and
plug-in hybrids each accounting for 50%. 92 In reaching these goals, China would become
not only the largest market for NEVs , but also the largest producer of NEVs in the
world. In the last chapter, the Thousands of Vehicles, Tens of Cities Program that was
discussed helped increase NEV production through subsidy initiatives, but the overall
ratio increase was relatively low; 93 meaning that China still has a long way to go before
they achieve these targets, especially when other countries, such as the United States and
leading countries of the EU, have also been pushing for NEV development.
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In Europe, electric vehicle activity has been led by cities like London, Paris, and
Berlin, largely at the local level. The mayor of London advocated the incentive schemes
to reduce taxes and fees on electric vehicles to reduce congestion and clean the air. Paris,
where Renault and Peugeot already have some 30,000 battery powered electric vehicles
in use, worked with the local utility and the local government to develop a plan that
includes more than $2.5 billion US in investments in charging infrastructure. Berlin has
been following a similar path, but the key driver has been utilities that see major
dividends in electric vehicles for future revenues and in capacity investment reduction
through the use of the vehicle’s batteries for storage.
The U.S. Government has been promoting electric vehicle technology and has
invested approximately $2.4 billion US in electrification grants. This has included $1.5
billion US in battery manufacturing, $500 million US in electric vehicle components and
$400 million US in infrastructure projects. In many respects, the U.S. program is similar
to the Chinese model where there is a top-down funding and coordination, albeit on a
smaller scale. Infrastructure pilots are being deployed under the EV Project Program
across several states including Tennessee, Arizona, California, Oregon and Washington.
Cities like San Diego, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, New York, and Washington
D.C. are all preparing for deploying charging infrastructure. 94
The Chinese infrastructure varies as each different city has tried to adapt the
policies in their own was; the Beijing Bus Pilot Program of (none other than) Beijing City
relies heavily on automated battery swapping infrastructure. Shenzhen is actively seeking
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to position public charging lots close to apartment buildings where most residents
live. 95China not only has to be conscious of the lofty goals set by the central government
and individual provinces but that their global competitors are also taking NEVs as a
serious means to help reduce pollution and oil dependence. They also have to be aware
that infrastructure issues are important hurdles to overcome when trying to establish
NEVs as the dominant mode of transportation in your country. 96
In many parts of the U.S., urban drivers have access to garages for overnight
home charging their needs. In Chinese cities where high rises dominate, authorities will
have to explore parking centers close to residential buildings where owners can charge
vehicles overnight. Public charging will also be required for drivers who wish to travel
beyond the reach of their battery charges. This need for charging stations and
infrastructure was demonstrated in a study conducted by the Japanese Utility, Tokyo
Electric Power Company in 2007 and 2008.
Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) initially installed chargers at the home
of electric vehicle owners. Due in part to what is commonly referred to as “range
anxiety,” the drivers returned home with batteries typically less than half depleted. Later
in 2008, TEPCO installed a number of public charging stations. Curiously, although the
public chargers were not used extensively, drivers began to return home with batteries
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significantly more depleted than in 2007 – they knew the public chargers were available
even if they did not need to use them. 97 Therefore, it is generally accepted that some
amount of public charging infrastructure will be required, even if it is not clear how much
precisely. These infrastructure costs will be borne by the Chinese government who, given
the 12th Five-year plan, sees this industry as a key component to lowering pollution and
protecting itself from energy security risks and understands that the cost of infrastructure
is a small price to pay. The 12th Five-year plan is monumental in the establishment of
policies to increase energy security in China by reducing consumption of fossil fuels and
to acknowledge NEV’s as a pillar industry which can address their efforts to restructure
the economy, promote social equality, protect the environment, slow energy demands,
and transition from a “Made in China” to “Designed in China” technology. 98
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VI. Conclusion
The Chinese auto industry is a window into the planning process of the Chinese
Communist Party; the Five-year planning process and other central policies discussed
through out this paper demonstrate the Chinese governments adjustments and recognition
to concerns both within their country and externally. The adjustments made by the
Chinese are not just to make progress, but they are efforts to become the dominant player
in the market so that technology can be “Designed in China” instead of “Made in China.”
The recent victory at the LA Auto Show is an example of the Chinese efforts paying off.
At the 2013 Auto Show in LA, a Chinese team from SAIC Motors was declared
the winners of the Los Angeles Auto Show Design Challenge for its Roewe Mobiliant
design. Design houses from all around the world, such as Mazda, Subaru, Toyota, and
JAC Motors submit futuristic and unusual vehicles based around a central theme. This
year judges deliberate on the most effective answers to the theme, “Biomimcy and
Mobility 2025 – Natures Answer to Human Challenges.” Vehicles designs took
inspiration from nature, as well as addressing some of the modern world’s most pressing
transportation issues – such as congestion, pollution, sustainability, and safety; all of
which China is currently facing within its’ auto industry.
The Mobiliant design not only is a car design, but a whole new design of
infrastructure that includes a new highway system that features non-stop intersections and
connections straight to the floor of your office building. It was inspired by the
relationship between ants and trumpet trees. The judges did agree that the Chinese design
was the most optimistic, however, it demonstrates a new ability that Chinese companies
41

have always lacked in; design. Chinese car companies have relied heavily on foreign
technology and designs in the past to develop their auto industry but new design ability
demonstrated at the LA Auto Show could be the shift we have been waiting for.
The design by the SAIC Motor team addresses all of the issues China has faced or
might eventually face with their auto industry. 99 Energy security issues are no more as
the Mobiliant car is zero emissions and part of an ‘urban ecological system’ that creates a
continuous cycle of fuel. Foreign technology will be not be of concern as the new system
provides everything the Chinese need for individual transportation. This new design is
truly the answer to all of the Chinese problems, however, it must be pointed out that this
was simply a concept design and the technology to put this idea into mass scale
production does not exist yet. That should not damage the hopes of the Chinese auto
industry, as the ability to design such a system is the true achievement.
In attending the 2013 LA Auto Show myself, I was able to get a first hand
experience of the cars available in the United States the next year. And what was on
display at almost every car company? New-energy vehicles. It was plain to see that NEVs
are the near future of the global auto industry, as the sales pitch across the convention
center was ‘you do not have to give up luxury and power when considering a NEV for
purchase.’ While there were no Chinese brands present at the LA Auto Show this year, it
will be interesting to see how much longer it takes them to enter into the American
market given the Chinese push to develop NEVs on such a national scale and their goal to
become the top producer and market for new-electric vehicles. Will China be able to
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make this adjustment to NEVs on their own and be able to employ new technology and
designs or will they continue in the shadow of their foreign partners and competition.
Only time will tell but as long as China maintains their efforts, I believe that they will
usher in their multi-polar world order.
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Beginning of End Notes
It, I believe, is important to address a said limiting factor that many scholars believe
China faces as it moves forward with its central planning which is the corruption within
Communist ruling party. Minxin Pei, for example, argues this point in his book, China’s
Trapped Transition, the limits of Developmental Autocracy, and captures, I believe, very
nicely this issue in his quote of the former general secretary of the CCP, Zhao Ziyan,
“The problem is, the CCP is a party built on the basis of Leninism. It controls all
the resources of the country… under a market economy, after property becomes
legitimate and legal, the CCP inevitable becomes corrupt. Those with power still
certainly use their control of the resources to turn society’s wealth into their
private wealth. These people have become a huge entrenched interest group…
What China has now is the worst form of capitalism. Western capitalism in its
early phase was also bad, but it could gradually become more progressive. But the
worst form of capitalism in China today is incapable of becoming more
progressive.” 100
The corruption in China is hard to ignore, especially after the public denouncement of Bo
Xi li and his corrupt ties. 101 I do believe that dealing with corruption has become an
integral part of the Chinese governments planning and can be seen as a less important
part of how Chinese business is conducted, although none-the-less still present as it is in
any market place, free or controlled. 102 I also believe that democratization, again argued
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x

I wanted to highlight again that China’s Five-year plans are blueprints: they provide
overall objectives and goals related to social and economic growth and industrial
planning in key sectors and regions. Although most consider the Five-year plan to be a
single document, the Five-year plan represents a complex web of Chinese policy-making,
containing previously-implemented regional and long-term development plans and
hundreds of targeted policy initiatives, all of which undergo constant review and revision
over the course of the five-year cycle. I have tried to show, up to now, the different
policies and programs that were implemented along the auto industry timeline in hopes
that you could see the adjustments the Chinese government made as new issues arose
within the industry and from external threats.
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